# In re Bailey Aggregated by Superinsight from public-domain sources, as of 2026-09-08. Domain: va/cavc. --- ## In re Bailey, 11 Vet. App. 267 (1998) {#8205384} *11 Vet. App. 267* _In re Bailey, 11 Vet. App. 267, decided 1998-06-11._ ORDER PER CURIAM: Attorney R. Greg Bailey (respondent) was permitted to appear pro hac vice, pursuant to Rule 46(e) of the Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (Court’s Rules) and under the auspices of the Veterans Consortium Pro Bono Program (Program), as counsel for the appellant in Odrosky v. Brown, No. 94-193, on April 24, 1994. After the respondent failed to file a brief or otherwise prosecute the appeal in accordance with orders of the Court and the Court’s Rules, the Court, on June 2,1995, dismissed the appeal. On June 28, 1995, the Court reinstated the appeal and ordered the respondent, in connection with his request to withdraw as counsel for the appellant, to provide specific information related to the respondent’s conduct in the case. The respondent filed a late response to the Court’s order, stating why he could not comply with one item in the order and either not complying with or ignoring the other four items in the order. Thereafter, on October 6, 1995, the respondent was permitted to withdraw as counsel for the appellant, and the Program assigned a replacement attorney to the case. The matter of the respondent’s conduct in Odrosky was referred to this panel of the Court. On December 1, 1995, the Court referred the matter to the Court’s Committee on Admission and Practice (Committee) for investigation and report to the Court. Following communications with the Program and the respondent, the filing of a report with the Court on July 18, 1996, to which the respondent objected, and the conduct of a telephonic hearing on November 7, 1997, the Committee filed a supplemental and final report with the Court on February 27, 1998. In its report, the Committee recommended that the respondent’s privilege of practicing pro hac vice before the Court be suspended for a period of two years and that this disciplinary action be reported to the other bars of which the respondent is a member. A review of the Committee’s report and the filings of the respondent reveals that the respondent failed to contact his client prior to the dismissal of the appeal on June 2, 1995, and only indirectly contacted him thereafter through a telephone call made by the respondent’s father, a non-attorney. On March 30, 1998, the Court ordered the respondent to show cause why the Court should not impose the recommended discipline. The respondent replied to the Court’s order on April 30,1998. The respondent’s misconduct, which involved a lack of diligence in prosecuting this appeal on behalf of the appellant and the failure to respond to lawful requests for information from a disciplinary authority of this Court, violates Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.1 of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have been adopted by this Court, in Rule 1(b) of the Court’s Rules of Admission and Practice, as its Code of Professional Responsibility. On consideration of the foregoing, the recommendation. of the Committee, and the responses filed by the respondent, it is ORDERED that attorney R. Greg Bailey is hereby publicly reprimanded for the conduct described above. --- ## In re Bailey, 11 Vet. App. 348 (1998) {#8205397} *11 Vet. App. 348* _In re Bailey, 11 Vet. App. 348, decided 1998-07-31._ ORDER PER CURIAM: On June 11,1998, the Court publicly reprimanded attorney R. Greg Bailey (respondent) for misconduct. In. accordance with the Court’s Rules of Admission and Practice, copies of the order imposing the reprimand were sent to bar disciplinary authorities in Missouri, Illinois, and the District of Columbia; to the clerks of the United States Courts of Appeal for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits and the Supreme Court of the United States; to the American Bar Association’s National Disciplinary Data Bank; and to the Court’s regular mailing list for publication. On July 9, 1998, the respondent filed a motion to stay the Court’s order pending appeal. On the same date, the respondent also filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA) to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). In Villamor v. West, the Court held that “the filing of [an] NOA seeking review in the Federal Circuit deprives this Court of jurisdiction” over a motion for full Court review filed the day before the NOA. Villamor, 11 Vet.App. 193 (1998) (en banc), appeal reinstated, No. 98-7043 (Fed.Cir. July 23, 1998); see also Cerullo v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 195, 196 (1991) (“filing of an NOA confers plenary jurisdiction upon an appellate court.”). Cf. Fed.CiR.R. 8(a) (referring to “[application for a stay ... pending appeal” being made “in the first instance in the district court” as contrasted with an application “for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an appeal”); Fed.R.App.P. 8(a) (same). Accordingly, the Court is without jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s motion. On consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED that the respondent’s motion is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this order to all entities to which copies of the Court’s June 11, 1998, order were sent pursuant to Rule 11(b) and (c) of the Court’s Rules of Admission and Practice. --- NEBEKER, Chief Judge, dissenting: I dissent from the dismissal of the respondent’s motion and would, instead, deny the stay. My colleagues, reading and application of the notice-of-appeal-transfer-of-jurisdiction cases fails to account for the near universal exception where a stay pending appeal is sought. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Circuit’s Rules, while not expressly dealing with this Court, provides that the immediately subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction to act on a motion for a stay. In fact, where a party has not so moved, that Rule mandates that the party file an affidavit explaining why it was not practicable to file such a motion in the subordinate tribunal. See also Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 8(a) to the same effect. My reading of these Rules, and the practice thereunder dictates that it is not only common sense to have the acting tribunal rule first on a stay request, but that there is limited jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, I would act on the motion, and deny it because there is not shown a likelihood of success on the purported appeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) and (c).