# Lee v. West

Aggregated by Superinsight from public-domain sources, as of 2026-09-08. Domain: va/cavc.

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## Lee v. West, 12 Vet. App. 545 (1999) {#8205552}

*12 Vet. App. 545*

_Lee v. West, 12 Vet. App. 545, decided 1999-08-24._

ORDER

PER CURIAM:
On April 20, 1998, the pro se appellant, veteran Raymond Lee, appealed a March 18, 1998, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals that denied entitlement to an effective date earlier than September 20, 1994, for an award and payment of monthly disability benefits under the Total Disability Insurance Provision of the appellant’s National Service Life Insurance (NSLI) policy. Record (R.) at 10. The appellant has filed a brief, the Secretary has filed a motion for affirmance by a single judge, and the appellant has filed an opposition thereto. The case was thereafter referred to this panel for consideration.

The Court notes that the provision, regarding monthly disability benefits, in the appellant’s NSLI policy as amended effective on August 7, 1968 (R. at 87-89), is based on former 38 C.F.R. § 8.99(a)(D), which provided that “disability payments will be paid from the first day of the seventh consecutive month of continuous total disability, except that if the total disability is not due to one of the specific causes listed ... above, the disability income payments will not relate back to a date more than 6 months prior to receipt ... of the required proof’. The Court further notes, however, the requirements of the applicable statutory provision, cited by the Board (R. at 4, 6), that “the Secretary shall ... include in any [NSLI] policy on the life of the insured (except a policy issued under section 620 of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, or section 1922 of this title) provisions whereby an insured who is shown to have become totally disabled for a period of six consecutive months or more ... shall be paid monthly disability benefits from the first day of the seventh consecutive month of ... such total disability”. 38 U.S.C. § 1915 (emphasis added). Neither party has addressed the question whether the disability-benefits provision in the appellant’s NSLI policy is consistent with the statutory requirements in 38 U.S.C. § 1915, quoted above.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that, not later than 30 days after the date of this order, the Secretary file, and serve on the appellant, a memorandum addressing the above question and in-*546eluding an appendix containing all of the terms and conditions ever in effect in connection with the appellant’s NSLI policy. It is further

ORDERED that, not later than 30 days after service of the Secretary’s memorandum, the appellant file a memorandum in response.

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## Lee v. West, 13 Vet. App. 131 (1999) {#8205581}

*13 Vet. App. 131*

_Lee v. West, 13 Vet. App. 131, decided 1999-10-22._

*132ORDER

PER CURIAM:
On September 23, 1999, the Secretary filed a motion for an extension of time until October 23, 1999, to respond to the Court’s August 24, 1999, briefing order. On September 28, 1999, the Clerk of the Court, at the direction of the panel, stamp-granted the motion and permitted the Secretary to file until October 25, 1999, a Monday, to file his response. On October 1, 1999, the pro se appellant filed an objection to the Secretary’s September 23, 1999, motion; the appellant asserts that “[t]he history of Appellee in this case is a failure in every instance to file a timely pleading when required.” In light of the appellant’s opposition, the Court will revoke the Clerk’s September 28, 1999, stamp-grant.

The Court notes that the Secretary has been granted a 60-day extension of time to file the designation of the record and another 60-day extension of time to file his brief. In contrast, the appellant has requested no extensions of time. See In re A Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(b), 12 Vet.App. 432, 436 (1998) (en banc memorandum and order) (in considering motions for extension of time, Court will consider “total record of the timeliness of filings by the moving party” and “the extent to which [the party opposing an extension motion] has been granted extensions”). Hence, the appellant’s assertions are substantiated, and the Court will construe the appellant’s “objection as an objection to any further extension motion in [this] case.” Id. at 436. Accordingly, the Court trusts that the Secretary will file his response not later than October 25, 1999.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that, the Court’s September 28, 1999, stamp-grant is revoked. It is further

ORDERED that the Secretary’s motion is granted. The Secretary is directed to file his response not later than October 25, 1999.

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## Lee v. West, 13 Vet. App. 137 (1999) {#8205584}

*13 Vet. App. 137*

_Lee v. West, 13 Vet. App. 137, decided 1999-11-03._

ORDER

PER CURIAM:
On September 23, 1999, the Secretary filed a motion for an extension of time until October 23, 1999, to respond to the Court’s August 24, 1999, briefing order. On September 28, 1999, the Clerk of the Court, at the direction of the panel, stamp-granted the motion and permitted the Secretary until October 25,1999, a Monday, to file his response. On October 1, 1999, the pro se appellant filed an objection to the Secretary’s September 23, 1999, motion; the appellant asserted that “[t]he history of Appellee in this case is a failure in every instance to file a timely pleading when required.”

On October 22, 1999, the Court revoked the September 28, 1999, stamp-grant; directed the Secretary to file his response not later than October 25, 1999; and stated that it would construe the appellant’s objection as an objection to any further extension motion in this case. On the same day as the Court’s order was issued, the Secretary filed a second motion for an extension of time to respond to the Court’s August 24, 1999, briefing order; he asks for an extension until November 22, 1999. On November 1, 1999, the appellant filed an opposition to the Secretary’s extension motion.

As the Court noted in its October 22, 1999, order, the Secretary has already been granted in this case a 60-day extension of time to file the designation of the record and another 60-day extension of time to file his brief. He has also now taken an additional 30 days to file his response to the Court’s August 24, 1999, briefing order. In contrast, the appellant has requested no extensions of time. See In re A Proposed Amendment to Rule 26(b), 12 Vet.App. 432, 436 (1998) (en banc memorandum and order) (in considering motions for extension of time, Court will consider “total record of the timeliness of filings by the moving party” and “the extent to which [the party opposing an extension motion] has been granted extensions”). Hence, the appellant’s assertions are substantiated. However, because of the importance of obtaining the Secretary’s response to the Court’s briefing order, the Court will grant the Secretary’s motion to file his response not later than November 22,1999.

*138The Court notes that during the past year the total of extension motions filed by the Secretary has ranged from 218 to 165 per month. Although this shows substantial improvement from the high of 443 extension motions filed by the Secretary in December 1997, the total for September 1999 was 199, which marks a sharp deviation from the generally downward trend experienced over the prior 15 months. The Court thus expresses its concern over the September increase.

On consideration of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that the Secretary’s motion is granted. The Secretary is directed to file his response not later than November 22, 1999. Absent truly extraordinary circumstances, which do not include a heavy workload on the part of counsel for the Secretary or the reasons set forth in the Secretary’s October 22, 1999, motion, the Court will grant the Secretary no further opposed (explicitly or as construed) extensions of time to file a brief in this case.
