# Smith v. Gober Aggregated by Superinsight from public-domain sources, as of 2026-09-08. Domain: va/cavc. --- ## Smith v. Gober, No. 98-255 (2000) {#816696} *No. 98-255* Official source: _Smith v. Gober, No. 98-255, decided 2000-08-31._ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS No. 98-255 CLAUDUS G. SMITH , APPELLANT , V. HERSHEL W. GOBER, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Decided August 31, 2000 ) Jay D. Majors, of Washington, D.C., was on the pleadings for the appellant. John H. Thompson, Acting General Counsel; Ron Garvin, Assistant General Counsel; Carolyn F, Washington, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Peter M. Donawick, all of Washington, D.C., were on the pleadings for the appellee. Before FARLEY, IVERS, and GREENE, Judges. IVERS, Judge: The veteran, Claudus G. Smith, appeals from a December 16, 1997, Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) decision that dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim for payment of accrued interest on an award of past-due-disability benefits. Record (R.) at 5. Both the veteran and the Secretary have submitted briefs. Counsel for the veteran entered an appearance in this matter through the pro bono program. The Court wishes to compliment counsel on his presentation in this matter and thank him for his service to the veteran and thereby to this Court. The Court notes that counsel for the veteran requested oral argument in his brief. Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 1. The Court finds that "oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of this appeal." Mason v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 44, 59. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will affirm the BVA's December 16, 1997, decision. I. FACTS The veteran served in the U.S. Air Force from May 1950 to May 1954, and from November 1955 to August 1957. R. at 13. In a February 26, 1958, rating decision, the veteran was granted service connection for chorio-retinal eye degeneration with a disability rating of 70% effective August 24, 1957. R. at 8. On February 2, 1961, the veteran's eyes were examined at a VA medical center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and he was diagnosed with "gun barrel vision of 5 degrees bilateral secondary to Retinitis Pigmentosa." Id. On February 20, 1961, the rating board requested reexamination of the veteran by two eye specialists regarding the veteran's diagnosis of retinitis pigmentosa. On May 16, 1961, after a review of the February 20 examination results, the regional office (RO) continued the 70% evaluation based on the examination of the two ophthalmologists. R. at 8. A January 1, 1992, rating decision granted the veteran 100% disability for chorio-retinal degeneration from November 8, 1991, the date of his claim for an increased rating. Id. On April 13, 1993, the Board found that the May 16, 1961, rating decision contained clear and unmistakable error (CUE). R. at 12. The RO then awarded the veteran a 100% rating for chorio-retinal eye degeneration; special monthly compensation for blindness in both eyes with visual acuity of 50/200 or less, effective February 2, 1961; and special monthly compensation for blindness in both eyes having light perception only, effective November 8, 1991. R. at 8-10, 12-13, 15-18, 20. The veteran, after verification of his military retirement pay, was awarded past due benefits for VA disability compensation in the amount of $203,497.31 for the period from February 2, 1961 to July 31, 1993. R. at 22-25. On March 26, 1994, the veteran wrote a letter to VA requesting that interest be paid on the retroactive benefits awarded in April 1993. R. at 27. The RO in Muskogee, Oklahoma, informed the veteran in a April 22, 1994, letter that VA regulations "do not provide for interest to be paid on retroactive awards." Id. In a February 26, 1996, letter the veteran again requested payment of interest on his past due benefits. R. at 35. Again the RO, in a March 5, 1996, letter, informed the veteran that VA regulations did not provide for the payment of interest on a retroactive claim. R. at 39. On April 14, 1996, the veteran wrote another letter expressing displeasure that he had not received formal notice of a VA decision concerning the payment of interest on his past due benefits. R. at 2 44. The RO, in a May 29, 1996, response, treated the April 14, 1996, letter as a Notice of Disagreement (NOD). R. at 46-47. In July 1996, the veteran received a Statement of the Case (SOC). R. at 46-51. The veteran appealed his case to the Board. R. at 53-57. In October 1996, the veteran had an RO hearing, where he reiterated his belief that he was entitled to payment of interest on his past due benefits. R. at 59. The Board, in the December 16, 1997, decision here on appeal, determined: Absent a statute authorizing the payment of interest by the VA Secretary on awards of disability compensation, no law or regulation affecting the provisions of benefits by the VA to veterans or dependents or survivors administered by the VA is for consideration. The merits of the veteran's claim cannot be addressed by the Board as we are without jurisdiction. As there is not an issue appropriate for appellate review by this Board, the appeal must be dismissed. R. at 4. II. ANALYSIS A. Jurisdiction The Board erroneously dismissed the veteran's claim for lack of jurisdiction. The Board conducted a full review of the interest issue and found that it lacked jurisdiction to review such a claim. R. at 3-4. This Court has held that "the BVA must review all issues which are reasonably raised from a liberal reading of the appellant's substantive appeal." Rivers v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 469, 471(1997) (quoting Myers v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 127, 129 (1991)); see Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 398, 410 (1995). If the Board had liberally framed the issue in terms of whether the appellant received the maximum monetary award to which he was legally entitled, including interest, or whether there were any amounts omitted in the calculation of the past-due benefits, including interest, the claim would have been within the Board's jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7104. Such error by the Board was harmless, however, because the veteran was not entitled to the payment of interest as a matter of law. B. Payment of Interest The payment of interest on past due benefits is a case of first impression before this Court. This Court reviews questions of law de novo without any deference to the Board's conclusion of law. 3 See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 532, 539 (1993) (en banc). The U. S. Supreme Court has clearly held that "[f]or well over a century, this Court, executive agencies, and Congress itself consistently have recognized that federal statutes cannot be read to permit interest to run on a recovery against the United States unless Congress affirmatively mandates that result." Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted the no-interest rule strictly. There can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed. U.S. v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947); see also McMahon v. U.S., 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) ("[S]tatutes which waive immunity of the United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign."); Fidelity Construction Co., 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Not only may the consent not be implied, but even a seemingly explicit consent will not be effective if the language used appears too sweeping and contrary to the overall statutory scheme as judicially deduced."). The veteran concedes that none of the exceptions to the no-interest rule apply in this case. Appellant's Br. at 7. The veteran rests his case upon the premise that 38 U.S.C. § 503(a) is an express statutory authorization for the payment of interest. The veteran contends that "[i]ndisputably, 38 U.S.C. § 503 waives sovereign immunity and statutorily authorizes the Secretary to provide any form of adjustment to an award of veterans benefits that he deems appropriate in cases, like this one, where there has been administrative error by the VA." Appellant's Br. at 7. Section 503(a), of title 38, United States Code, provides: If the Secretary determines that benefits administered by the Department have not been provided by reason of administrative error on the part of the Federal Government or any of its employees, the Secretary may provide such relief on account of such error as the Secretary deems equitable, including the payment of moneys to any person whom the Secretary determines is equitably entitled to such moneys. The veteran asks the Court to infer from the general language of section 503 that Congress has expressly consented to a waiver of sovereign immunity allowing the payment of interest. This 4 we cannot do. The Court cannot infer from the general language granting the Secretary the power of equitable relief that Congress has expressly granted the Secretary the authority to pay interest on past-due claims. Any ambiguity in the language of the statute that the veteran relies upon to support his position must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. As the Supreme Court has clearly instructed, any waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., supra. The Court cannot determine that Congress, by implication, authorized the payment of interest. It is unfortunate that the veteran for a period of over thirty years has been erroneously denied his benefits, but there is no statutory authority under which the Secretary may pay the veteran interest on those past due benefits. Since Congress did not expressly waive sovereign immunity in section 503, the veteran's argument that the Secretary expressly delegated his section 503 power to the Board in 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) is without merit and need not be considered further by the Court. Appellant's Br. at 9. The Secretary cannot delegate authority that he does not possess. Even assuming arguendo that the Secretary has the authority, he clearly has not delegated such authority. Section 2.7(c) of title 38, Code of Federal Regulations, expressly states that "[t]he authority to grant the equitable relief, referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, has not been delegated to and is reserved to the Secretary." The Court holds that section 503 does not authorize the Secretary to pay interest on past due benefits. C. Equitable Relief The veteran requests, in the alternative, that the Court direct the Board to order the Secretary, under his equitable powers, to adjust his past due benefits award to include the payment of interest. Appellant's Br. at 16-18. It is well established that this Court is a court of law, and not of equity, and we cannot provide equitable relief. Taylor v. West, 11 Vet.App. 436, 440 (1998). The Secretary's authority to grant equitable relief under section 503 is wholly within the Secretary's discretion, and the Court lacks jurisdiction even to review the exercise of the Secretary's equitable discretion. Zimick v. West, 11 Vet.App. 45, 50-51 (1998). Since the authority to grant equitable relief is discretionary the Court will not remand a matter on that ground. Erspamer v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 507, 512 (1996). The Court also does not have the power to compel the Secretary to exercise his authority to grant equitable relief as the veteran requests. Zimick, 11 Vet.App. at 50-51. 5 Even if the Secretary were inclined to grant the veteran equitable relief, he would not lawfully be permitted to do so. Because "the remedy sought is a monetary award against the U.S. government, and particularly where Congress has enacted an intricate and all-encompassing statutory scheme, such expenditures must be specifically authorized by statute." Malone v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 539, 542 (1997); see also OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 ("[T]he payment of money from the [Federal] Treasury must be authorized by statute."). Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme for the payment of veterans benefits. In this case, there is no statute or regulation that authorizes the Secretary to pay interest on past due benefits under any circumstances, to include the exercise of his equitable powers. III. CONCLUSION After consideration of the appellant's brief, the Secretary's brief, and the record, the Court holds that the appellant has not demonstrated that the Board committed either legal or factual error which would warrant reversal or remand with respect to the payment on interest on the veteran's past due claims. Section 503(a) does not expressly authorize the Secretary to pay interest on past due claims; therefore, the veteran is not entitled such a payment. The Court is also satisfied that the Board decision fulfills the "reasons or bases" requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). Accordingly, the December 16, 1997, Board decision is AFFIRMED. 6 --- ## Smith v. Gober, No. 99-1471 (2000) {#816716} *No. 99-1471* Official source: _Smith v. Gober, No. 99-1471, decided 2000-12-04._ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS NO . 99-1471 HAROLD E. SMITH , APPELLANT , V. HERSHEL W. GOBER, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Decided December 4, 2000 ) Mark R. Lippman, of La Jolla, California, was on the brief for the appellant. Leigh A. Bradley, General Counsel; Ron Garvin, Assistant General Counsel; Michael A. Leonard, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Alicia Henning Pratz, all of Washington, D.C., were on the brief for the appellee. Before KRAMER, Chief Judge, and IVERS and GREENE, Judges. GREENE, Judge: Harold E. Smith, through counsel, appeals a July 16, 1999, Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) decision that denied service connection for malignant melanoma of his left foot. He asserts that the Board erred procedurally by not ensuring that a Board remand order to the VA regional office (RO) was complied with by the examining VA oncologist. Mr. Smith raises several other issues that need not be addressed here. The Court has jurisdiction over the case under 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). For the following reasons, the Board's decision will be vacated and the matter remanded. I. FACTS Mr. Smith served on active duty in the U.S. Army from September 21, 1966, to July 5, 1968. Record (R.) at 82. In October 1967, an Army dermatologist opined that Mr. Smith had skin cancer and sun-damaged skin on his face, and placed him on a medical profile that required him to avoid duties requiring any exposure to the sun. R. at 55-56. In May 1968, a medical examination report in conjunction with separation did not indicate abnormal skin and noted he had never had any skin diseases but that he had been advised to have a cyst removed. R. at 68-71, 78. In October 1992, Mr. Smith had a lesion removed from his left foot and a malignant melanoma was excised. R. at 102. In January 1993, he filed a claim for entitlement to service connection for skin cancer. R. at 89-92. During a June 1993 compensation and pension (C&P) medical examination, Mr. Smith told the examiner that while on active duty he had been advised to have a black mole removed from his left foot but that he did not have it removed until 1992. R. at 102. In September 1993, the Houston, Texas, RO denied Mr. Smith's claim for service connection for skin cancer of the left foot after concluding that the condition was not manifested in service nor within one year following service. R. at 113. He filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD), the RO issued a Statement of the Case (SOC), and he filed a Substantive Appeal with the Board. R. at 120- 29, 148-49. In June 1996, the Board remanded the case to the RO and directed inter alia: In relation to the veteran's claim for service connection for malignant melanoma, the veteran should be examined by specialists in dermatology and oncology. The examiners should state an opinion on whether the malignant melanoma is related to service, and in particular, to the skin cancer and sun damaged skin that were noted in the service medical records dated in October 1967. The veteran's claims folder should be made available to the examiners in conjunction with the examination. R. at 343 (emphasis added). In January 1998, the matter was referred to a VA dermatologist who reported, "After reviewing the file of the veteran . . . it is my opinion that his malignant melanoma is not related to service." R. at 461 (emphasis added). Also in January 1998, a VA oncologist reported: Mr. Smith has 2 cancers: 1. Non-melanoma skin cancers. Its cause(s) predate patient[']s joining service. It manifested soon after he joined service. It is related to sun exposure but not in the short duration as Mr. Smith had in service. 2. Melanoma of skin of sole of foot. It is related to sun exposure but less so than non-melanoma skin cancer that preceded melanoma. Personal susceptibility play an important role in its occurrence. Again duration of exposure and intensity of exposure are determinant of its development. None of the above skin cancers in this patient appear to be related to service. 2 R. at 462. However, the oncologist made no reference to reviewing the claims folder, and neither doctor indicated that he had examined Mr. Smith. Based upon these opinions, the RO issued a Supplemental SOC that again denied the claim. R. at 472-76. In July 1999, the Board, relying on the dermatologist and oncologist reports, denied Mr. Smith's claim for service connection for malignant melanoma of the left foot. R. at 1-14. This appeal followed. II. APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS On appeal, Mr. Smith contends that the Board erred by rendering a decision in his case before the RO had complied with the remand instructions. Essentially, he argues that the remand order to provide him an examination and to review his claims file has not been fully complied with. In response, the Secretary argues that "[t]here is a presumption of regularity under which it is presumed that government officials have properly discharged their official duties." Therefore, the Secretary contends, it should be presumed that the RO complied with the remand order. In Stegall v. West, 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 (1994), this Court held that the Board's remand of a matter to the RO confers on the claimant, as a matter of law, the right to compliance with that remand order. Further, such remands impose upon the Secretary a concomitant duty to ensure compliance with the terms of the remand. Id. It is clear from these mandates that the Secretary is responsible for ensuring the proper execution and administration of all laws administered by VA and that holdings of this Court are precedent to be followed. Stegall, supra. Turning to the events in this case, the Board denied Mr. Smith's claim after relying upon the reports by the dermatologist and oncologist. However, a Board's decision that relies upon a medical examination that failed to comply with remand instructions will result in a Stegall violation and require a remand. See Stegall, supra. Nowhere in its decision does the Board address or discuss compliance with its remand order. Although the Board relies upon the medical opinions in question, the Court notes that neither revealed whether Mr. Smith was given an examination by either specialist as required by the remand order. Further, only the dermatologist reports that he reviewed Mr. Smith's claims file. 3 The Secretary's position that under the doctrine of administrative regularity it may be presumed that the doctors conducted the examination and the oncologist reviewed the claims file is misplaced and must be rejected. The Secretary cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in this case to show compliance with the remand instructions because there has been no showing that VA has uniform procedures for the administrative processing of remanded claims for which specialized medical examinations have been requested and for which the claims file has been directed to be made available to the examiners. VA, of course, through its General Counsel, Compensation & Pension Director, and the Veterans Health Administration, could endeavor to establish simple templates or procedures that could ensure compliance with even the most complex of remand orders, including procedures establishing that when VA examiners receive special directions to examine a veteran and to conduct a medical review of a veteran's claims file, they would clearly note that these requirements have been complied with. Such procedures could require that examiners comply with the specific instructions of the remand in order to form the basis for their medical opinions. In other words, the Secretary could develop specific measures to meet Stegall's requirement of compliance with remand orders. Here, however, there has been no showing that such procedures exist. Therefore, without such procedures, the Secretary's position ignores the Stegall directive that a remand order confers upon the claimant the right to compliance with remand orders and that the Secretary has the burden of ensuring compliance. To accept such an argument in the absence of established procedures would allow the Secretary to abrogate his Stegall duty. The administrative regularity presumption is interpreted to encompass regular acts performed in the ordinary course of government business. See YT v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 195 (1996); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 356 (7th ed. 1999) (defining ordinary course of business as "[t]he normal routine in managing a trade or business"). If the act is not a regular one but is irregular, the Secretary is not entitled to the presumption. See Warfield v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 483, 486 (1997); see also United States v. Roses, Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The presumption [of official regularity may also] operate[] in reverse. If [the act] appears irregular, it is irregular, and the burden shifts to the proponent to show the contrary"). Accordingly, the Court will vacate the Board's decision and remand the matter to ensure that Mr. Smith is afforded his right to compliance with the remand order. 4 III. CONCLUSION On consideration of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Board committed legal error that warrants remand. Accordingly, the Board's July 16, 1999, decision is VACATED and the matter REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and in accordance with all applicable statutes and regulations, and issuance of a decision supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (d)(1); Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 394, 397 (1991). The Board shall proceed expeditiously in accordance with section 302 of the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994) (found at 38 U.S.C. § 5101 note) (requiring Secretary to provide for "expeditious treatment" for claims remanded by Board or Court). See Drosky v. Brown, 10 Vet.App. 251, 257 (1997); Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 517, 533-34 (1995). On remand, the appellant may submit additional evidence and argument on the remanded claim, including the additional issues that the appellant has submitted to this Court. See Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369 (1999) (per curiam order). The Court reiterates that a remand by this Court or by the Board confers on an appellant the right to VA compliance with the remand order and imposes on the Secretary a concomitant duty to ensure compliance with the terms of such an order. See Stegall, supra. 5 --- ## Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227 (2000) {#2642503} *14 Vet. App. 227* Official source: _Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 227, decided 2000-12-22._ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS No. 98-255 CLAUDUS G. SMITH , APPELLANT , V. HERSHEL W. GOBER, ACTING SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE. On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Decided December 22, 2000 ) Jay D. Majors, of Washington, D.C., was on the pleadings for the appellant. John H. Thompson, Acting General Counsel; Ron Garvin, Assistant General Counsel; Carolyn F. Washington, Deputy Assistant General Counsel; and Peter M. Donawick, all of Washington, D.C., were on the pleadings for the appellee. Before FARLEY, IVERS, and GREENE, Judges. IVERS, Judge: The veteran, Claudus G. Smith, appeals from a December 16, 1997, Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) decision that dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, a claim for payment of accrued interest on an award of past-due disability benefits. Record (R.) at 5. Both the veteran and the Secretary have submitted briefs. Counsel for the veteran entered an appearance in this matter through the pro bono program. The Court wishes to compliment counsel on his presentation in this matter and thank him for his service to the veteran and thereby to this Court. The Court notes that counsel for the veteran requested oral argument in his brief. Appellant's Brief (Br.) at 1. The Court finds that "oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of this appeal." Mason v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 44, 59. This appeal is timely, and the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a). On August 31, 2000, the Court issued an opinion in this case, Smith v. Gober, 14 Vet.App. 96 (2000), that affirmed the Board's December 16, 1997, decision. The Court denied the veteran's motion for reconsideration on October 31, 2000. Judgment was recalled in this case pursuant to In Re: Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, U.S. Vet. App. Misc. Order No. 4-00 (Nov. 13, 2000) (en banc) because of the recent enactment of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096, (Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter VCAA]. Therefore, the Court will withdraw its August 31, 2000, opinion and issue this opinion in its stead. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will affirm the BVA's December 16, 1997, decision. I. FACTS The veteran served in the U.S. Air Force from May 1950 to May 1954, and from November 1955 to August 1957. R. at 13. In a February 26, 1958, rating decision, the veteran was granted service connection for chorio-retinal eye degeneration with a disability rating of 70% effective August 24, 1957. R. at 8. On February 2, 1961, the veteran's eyes were examined at a VA medical center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and he was diagnosed with "gun barrel vision of 5 degrees bilateral secondary to Retinitis Pigmentosa." Id. On February 20, 1961, the rating board requested reexamination of the veteran by two eye specialists regarding the veteran's diagnosis of retinitis pigmentosa. On May 16, 1961, after a review of the February 20 examination results, the regional office (RO) continued the 70% evaluation based on the examination of the two ophthalmologists. R. at 8. A January 1, 1992, rating decision granted the veteran 100% disability for chorio-retinal degeneration from November 8, 1991, the date of his claim for an increased rating. Id. On April 13, 1993, the Board found that the May 16, 1961, rating decision contained clear and unmistakable error. R. at 12. The RO then awarded the veteran a 100% rating for chorio-retinal eye degeneration; special monthly compensation for blindness in both eyes with visual acuity of 50/200 or less, effective February 2, 1961; and special monthly compensation for blindness in both eyes having light perception only, effective November 8, 1991. R. at 8-10, 12-13, 15-18, 20. The veteran, after verification of his military retirement pay, was awarded past due benefits for VA disability compensation in the amount of $203,497.31 for the period from February 2, 1961, to July 31, 1993. R. at 22-25. On March 26, 1994, the veteran wrote a letter to VA requesting that interest be paid on the 2 retroactive benefits awarded in April 1993. R. at 27. The RO in Muskogee, Oklahoma, informed the veteran in a April 22, 1994, letter that VA regulations "do not provide for interest to be paid on retroactive awards." Id. In a February 26, 1996, letter the veteran again requested payment of interest on his past-due benefits. R. at 35. Again the RO, in a March 5, 1996, letter, informed the veteran that VA regulations did not provide for the payment of interest on a retroactive claim. R. at 39. On April 14, 1996, the veteran wrote another letter expressing displeasure that he had not received formal notice of a VA decision concerning the payment of interest on his past-due benefits. R. at 44. The RO, in a May 29, 1996, response, treated the April 14, 1996, letter as a Notice of Disagreement. R. at 46-47. In July 1996, the veteran received a Statement of the Case. R. at 46-51. The veteran appealed his case to the Board. R. at 53-57. In October 1996, the veteran had an RO hearing, where he reiterated his belief that he was entitled to payment of interest on his past due benefits. R. at 59. The Board, in the December 16, 1997, decision here on appeal, determined: Absent a statute authorizing the payment of interest by the VA Secretary on awards of disability compensation, no law or regulation affecting the provisions of benefits by the VA to veterans or dependents or survivors administered by the VA is for consideration. The merits of the veteran's claim cannot be addressed by the Board as we are without jurisdiction. As there is not an issue appropriate for appellate review by this Board, the appeal must be dismissed. R. at 4. II. ANALYSIS A. Jurisdiction The Board erroneously dismissed the veteran's claim for lack of jurisdiction. The Board conducted a full review of the interest issue and found that it lacked jurisdiction to review such a claim. R. at 3-4. This Court has held that "the BVA must review all issues which are reasonably raised from a liberal reading of the appellant's substantive appeal." Rivers v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 469, 471(1997) (quoting Myers v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 127, 129 (1991)); see Godfrey v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 398, 410 (1995). If the Board had liberally framed the issue in terms of whether the appellant had received the maximum monetary award to which he was legally entitled, including 3 interest, or whether there were any amounts omitted in the calculation of the past-due benefits, including interest, the claim would have been within the Board's jurisdiction pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7104. Such error by the Board was harmless, however, because the veteran was not entitled to the payment of interest as a matter of law. B. Payment of Interest The payment of interest on past due benefits is a case of first impression before this Court. This Court reviews questions of law de novo without any deference to the Board's conclusion of law. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1); see also Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Butts v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 532, 539 (1993) (en banc). The U. S. Supreme Court has clearly held that "[f]or well over a century, this Court, executive agencies, and Congress itself consistently have recognized that federal statutes cannot be read to permit interest to run on a recovery against the United States unless Congress affirmatively mandates that result." Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 315 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted the no-interest rule strictly. There can be no consent by implication or by use of ambiguous language. Nor can intent on the part of the framers of a statute or contract to permit the recovery of interest suffice where the intent is not translated into affirmative statutory or contractual terms. The consent necessary to waive the traditional immunity must be express, and it must be strictly construed. U.S. v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 659 (1947); see also McMahon v. U.S., 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951) ("[S]tatutes which waive immunity of the United States from suit are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign."); Fidelity Construction Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Not only may the consent not be implied, but even a seemingly explicit consent will not be effective if the language used appears too sweeping and contrary to the overall statutory scheme as judicially deduced."). The veteran concedes that none of the exceptions to the no-interest rule applies in this case. Appellant's Br. at 7. The veteran rests his case upon the premise that 38 U.S.C. § 503(a) is an express statutory authorization for the payment of interest. The veteran contends that "[i]ndisputably, 38 U.S.C. § 503 waives sovereign immunity and statutorily authorizes the Secretary to provide any form of adjustment to an award of veterans benefits that he deems appropriate in cases, like this one, where there has been administrative error by the VA." Appellant's Br. at 7. Section 503(a), of title 38, 4 United States Code, provides: If the Secretary determines that benefits administered by the Department have not been provided by reason of administrative error on the part of the Federal Government or any of its employees, the Secretary may provide such relief on account of such error as the Secretary deems equitable, including the payment of moneys to any person whom the Secretary determines is equitably entitled to such moneys. The veteran asks the Court to infer from the general language of section 503 that Congress has expressly consented to a waiver of sovereign immunity allowing the payment of interest. This we cannot do. The Court cannot infer from the general language granting the Secretary the power of equitable relief that Congress has expressly granted the Secretary the authority to pay interest on past-due claims. Any ambiguity in the language of the statute that the veteran relies upon to support his position must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign, as the Supreme Court clearly instructed in N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., supra. It is unfortunate that the veteran for a period of over thirty years has been erroneously denied his benefits, but there is no statutory authority under which the Secretary may pay the veteran interest on those past due benefits. Since Congress did not expressly waive sovereign immunity in section 503, the veteran's argument that the Secretary expressly delegated his section 503 power to the Board in 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) is without merit and need not be considered further by the Court. Appellant's Br. at 9. The Secretary cannot delegate authority that he does not possess. Even assuming arguendo that the Secretary has the authority, he clearly has not delegated such authority. Section 2.7(c) of title 38, Code of Federal Regulations, expressly states that "[t]he authority to grant the equitable relief, referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, has not been delegated to and is reserved to the Secretary." The Court holds that section 503 does not authorize the Secretary pay interest on past due benefits. C. Equitable Relief The veteran requests, in the alternative, that the Court direct the Board to order the Secretary, under his equitable powers, to adjust his past due benefits award to include the payment of interest. Appellant's Br. at 16-18. It is well established that this Court is a court of law, and not of equity, and we cannot provide equitable relief. Taylor v. West, 11 Vet.App. 436, 440 (1998). The Secretary's authority to grant equitable relief under section 503 is wholly within the Secretary's 5 discretion, and the Court lacks jurisdiction even to review the exercise of the Secretary's equity discretion. Zimick v. West, 11 Vet.App. 45, 50-51 (1998). Since the authority to grant equitable relief is discretionary the Court will not remand a matter on that ground. Erspamer v. Brown, 9 Vet.App. 507, 512 (1996). The Court also does not have the power to compel the Secretary to exercise his authority to grant equitable relief as the veteran requests. Zimick, 11 Vet.App. at 50-51. Even if the Secretary were inclined to grant the veteran equitable relief, he would not lawfully be permitted to do so. Because "the remedy sought is a monetary award against the U.S. government, and particularly where Congress has enacted an intricate and all-encompassing statutory scheme, such expenditures must be specifically authorized by statute." Malone v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 539, 542 (1997); see also OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424 ("[T]he payment of money from the [Federal] Treasury must be authorized by statute."). Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme for the payment of veterans benefits. In this case, there is no statute or regulation that authorizes the Secretary to pay interest on past due benefits under any circumstances, to include the exercise of his equitable powers. The Court finds that the recent enactment of the VCAA, referenced supra, does not affect the issue decided in this case concerning whether a federal statute allows the payment of interest on past due benefits. Therefore, there is no reason to consider the VCAA in deciding this case. III. CONCLUSION After consideration of the appellant's brief, the Secretary's brief, and the record, the Court holds that the appellant has not demonstrated that the Board committed either legal or factual error which would warrant reversal or remand with respect to the payment on interest on the veteran's past due claims. Section 503(a) does not expressly authorize the Secretary to pay interest on past due claims; therefore, the veteran is not entitled such a payment. The Court is also satisfied that the Board decision fulfills the "reasons or bases" requirements of 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1). Accordingly, the December 16, 1997, Board decision is AFFIRMED. 6