Jones v. Derwinski

Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 231, decided 1992-03-13.

NEBEKER, Chief Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. MANKIN, Associate Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

NEBEKER, Chief Judge: After decisions on the merits in Jones v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 210 (1991), and Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308 (1991), appellants filed motions under portions of the Equal Access to Justice Act (the EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for, respectively, a bill of costs under section 2412(a) and (b), and an award of attorney fees and expenses under section 2412(d). Since both require the Court to determine the applicability of the EAJA to proceedings in this Court, the two cases have been consolidated for these purposes. We hold that the EAJA does not apply to proceedings in this Court, because the EAJA does not contain an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity as to such proceedings.

*232I.

The EAJA allows certain parties in litigation with the United States to recover costs and attorney fees. The relevant subsections of section 2412 provide, in pertinent part:

(a) ... a judgment for costs, as enumerated in section 1920 of this title, ... may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States ... in any court having jurisdiction of such action.

(b) ... a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, in addition to the costs which may be awarded pursuant to subsection (a), to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States ... in any court having jurisdiction of such action.

(c)(1) Any judgment ... for costs pursuant to subsection (a) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title

(2) Any judgment ... for fees and expenses of attorneys pursuant to subsection (b) shall be paid as provided in sections 2414 and 2517 of this title, except that if the basis for the award is a finding that the United States acted in bad faith, then the award shall be paid by any agency found to have acted in bad faith....

(d)(1)(A) ... a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action ..., including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1991) (emphasis added). To a certain extent, these subsections implement the “English rule” where the loser pays the legal fees and costs of the winner. The aim is “to eliminate for the average person the financial disincentive to challenge unreasonable governmental action.” Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 2319, 110 L.Ed.2d 134 (1990).

Appellants and several amici urge that since the EAJA’s objective is to eliminate financial disincentives to parties seeking to protect themselves from unjustified government action, the term “court having jurisdiction over such [civil] action”, which appears essentially in each of the operative subsections of section 2412, must be ?ead to include this Court. When confronted recently with a similar question in Ardestani v. INS, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 515, 118 L.Ed.2d 496 (1991), as to the scope of the administrative agency portion of the EAJA (5 U.S.C. § 504), the Supreme Court held that since the EAJA

renders the United States liable for attorneys fees for which it would not otherwise be liable ... it thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States.

Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 521. Ardestani then established the principles of statutory construction governing interpretation of the EAJA. The Court said:

We have no doubt that the broad purposes of the EAJA would be served by making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings_ But we cannot extend the EAJA to administrative deportation proceedings when the plain language of the statute [“under section 554” of the APA], coupled with the strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise.

Id. At the same time, the Court continued to recognize “that, once Congress has waived sovereign immunity over certain subject matter, the Court should be careful not to ‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.’ ” 112 S.Ct. at 520 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)). See also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (citing Ardestani and reaffirming the “traditional principle” of strict construction *233that sovereign immunity waiver requires “unequivocal expression ... in statutory text”).

Our resolution of the issue presented by these consolidated cases must be guided by these principles governing the waiver of sovereign immunity. We have little doubt that the purposes ascribed to the EAJA would be achieved by extending 28 U.S.C. § 2412 to proceedings in this Court; however, given the premise that waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the United States, we must determine whether the whole of section 2412 is clear regarding its applicability to this Court. If not, we are faced with statutory ambiguity and must leave such an extension to possible future legislative action. Ardestani, 112 S.Ct. at 521.

We turn to three reasons which have led us to find ambiguity in the EAJA warranting application of the rule against implied waiver of sovereign immunity. They are the Act itself, the legislative history, and division among the courts of appeals construing its terms.

II.

Despite the apparent plain meaning of both subsections (a) and (b) of section 2412 in extending to “any court having jurisdiction over such matter” authority to award costs and reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys, subsection (c) severely curtails the applicability of subsections (a) and (b). When coupled with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414 and 2517, subsection (c) authorizes payment of judgments only in the case of such awards by the “United States Claims Court”, “a district court or the Court of International Trade”. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2414, 2517. See Essex Electro Eng’rs Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed.Cir.1985). No provision authorizes payment of a judgment for such an award made by this Court.

Hence, we find substantial ambiguity as to the applicability of subsections (a) and (b) to this Court. For different reasons, we find ambiguity as to the application of subsection (d). An argument could be made that subsection (d), if read in isolation, applies to proceedings in this Court because we are a “Court having jurisdiction of [the] action” and because awards and judgments under § 2412(d) are not limited by subsection (c) (indeed, § 2412(d)(4) provides a separate payment authority for subsection (d) awards). However, an examination of the development of the EAJA and the specific amendments to, and in connection with, the 1980 original enactment, shows that when Congress has provided for the application of the EAJA to analogous litigation (Claims Court, Tax Court, Social Security Administration (SSA) decision review in district courts), it has done so by specific, affirmative legislation.

In 1982, the Tax Court was given its own EAJA-type provision. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-248, § 292(a) (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 7430; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e). Similarly, when the EAJA was reenacted in 1985, the Claims Court was specifically included. Pub.L. No. 99-80, § 2, 99 Stat. 183, 185 (1985); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F). The legislative history of the reenactment notes the intervening enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA), which abolished the Article III Court of Claims and established the United States Claims Court under Article I in its place. “Since some question has been raised about the jurisdiction of the U.S. Claims Court to make [EAJA] awards ... this amendment clarifies the jurisdictional issue and codifies existing law.” H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1985), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1985, pp. 132, 146.

As to Social Security Act administrative decisions reviewed in federal district court, the 1985 reenactment of the EAJA provided specifically that attorney fees and other expenses may be awarded under the EAJA, in a case where the attorney claims a contingent fee from an SSA award to a claimant, only if the attorney “refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Pub.L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985). Substantial similarity exists between the nature of most cases appealed to this Court and such Social Security reviews and between the contingent attorney-fee-agreement provisions applicable to the two *234types of appeals (38 U.S.C. § 5904 (formerly § 3404) and 42 U.S.C. § 406; S.Rep. No. 100-418, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1988)). Consequently, the enactment of the special coordination provision between EAJA fees and contingent fees in Social Security cases creates considerable additional ambiguity as to whether the Act was intended to authorize the availability of EAJA fees in this Court without providing for a similar preclusion of double payment to the attorney.

There is no question that Congress was well aware of the issue of attorney fees when it created this Court. Prior to this Court’s enabling act (the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub.L. No. 100-687, Div. A, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (VJRA)), attorneys were prohibited from charging a claimant more than ten dollars for representation. The VJRA, however, lifted the ten dollar cap and amended 38 U.S.C. § 5904 to provide expressly, but in a limited way, for attorneys to charge and be paid fees by Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) claimants for representation before the VA and this Court. Congress manifested its concern about private attorney fees by giving this Court and the Board of Veterans’ Appeals certain authority to order a reduction in fees found to be “excessive or unreasonable”, and sharply curtailing contingent-fee agreements. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c), 7263(d) (formerly §§ 4063(d), 3404(c)). Congress also specifically considered a provision which would have granted EAJA-type relief in connection with judicial review of VA claims decisions. See S.Rep. No. 418, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, 69 (1988). Indeed, the Senate had passed such legislation on four prior occasions and did so again in 1988. See S. 330, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(1) (1979); S. 349, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(1) (1981); S. 636, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1983); S. 367, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1985). Such a provision was not included in the compromise agreement leading to the ultimate enactment of the VJRA and the creation of this Court.

The Ardestani holding was predicated, in part, on “ambiguities in the legislative history” which, the Court held, “reinforced” application of “the limited nature of waivers of sovereign immunity.” Id. 112 S.Ct. at 518-19. Here, in addition to the lack of a specific waiver of sovereign immunity, there is significant ambiguity in the above history of the legislation creating this Court which raises the same kind of ambiguity as to this Court. This uncertainty is compounded by the split in the circuit courts of appeals on whether the EAJA applies to proceedings in the Article I bankruptcy courts.

In In Re Davis, 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1990), the Eleventh Circuit considered a bankruptcy court’s power to award EAJA fees, and held that the bankruptcy court, like the Tax Court, lacked power to make EAJA awards since it was not specifically included. The Court there also pointed out that attorneys could still receive EAJA relief if the bankruptcy judges submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district courts, which, after a de novo review, could ultimately determine the merits of the application and award fees. See In Re Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696 (11th Cir.1991). The Tenth Circuit, in O’Connor v. United States Dept. of Energy, 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.1991), however, held that the EAJA provided direct coverage in the bankruptcy courts and found the language “any court having jurisdiction of that action” to be plain, simple, and unambiguous. There is no need for us to take sides on this issue; it is sufficient merely to take note of the ambiguity which necessarily arises from the existence of such a split in the circuits.

III.

Appellants and several amici, as well as our dissenting colleague, argue that the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Essex Electro Eng’rs Inc. v. United States, supra, controls the disposition of this case. In concluding otherwise, we are mindful that the Essex decision is of extreme importance because some of our decisions, and possibly this one on the “interpretation” of the EAJA, are subject to review by the Federal Circuit (38 U.S.C. § 7292).

*235The Essex holding specifically related only to litigation in the Claims Court, an Article I court which succeeded and essentially replaced the Article III United States Court of Claims. See Pub.L. No. 97-164, §§ 105-169, 402-03, 96 Stat. at 26-51, 57-58. The transmutation from an Article III to an Article I court raised some doubt as to whether the “new” Claims Court had jurisdiction to enter EAJA awards. It is critical to note that the Essex holding was limited to the only Article I court then under the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Moreover, the Federal Circuit noted that the applicability of the EAJA to the Claims Court at that time was plainly indicated by the provisions then in § 2412(c) and (d)(4)(A). Those provisions incorporated the payment provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2517, which the FCIA had amended to make expressly applicable to the “Claims Court”, thereby authorizing payment of EAJA awards made by the Claims Court. Essex, 757 F.2d at 251-52. No such provisions provide similarly clear evidence of intent to include this Court under § 2412. Again, mindful that the Essex decision is of added import, we have concluded that any analysis in Essex that might be read as supporting the general applicability of the EAJA to Article I courts has been eclipsed by the subsequent Supreme Court guidance and holding in Ardestani.

IV.

We find it unnecessary, in light of what has been discussed and held herein, to deal with the question of whether an appeal to this Court is a “civil action”, a term of legal art (Fed.R.Civ.P.. 1-3), as contemplated in the EAJA. The same is true on the related question of “judicial review of agency action” in subsection (d) which calls into issue the difference between a petition for review of administrative action in the federal circuits, see Wilkett v. ICC, 844 F.2d 867 (D.C.Cir.1988), and district court review of other agency action, such as SSA decisions.

Accordingly, the bill of costs is DISMISSED and the motions for attorney fees DENIED.

MANKIN, Associate Judge, dissenting:

In spite of the majority’s attempt to explain it away, the law of this Circuit, as expressed in Essex Electro Eng’rs Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 247 (Fed.Cir.1985) prevails.

While 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1991) states that “ ‘court’ includes the United States Claims Court,” it is not meant to be an exclusion of all other Article I courts not specifically enumerated. The amendment to include the United States Claims Court within the purview of the EAJA was enacted before the creation of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals. Pub.L. 99-80, § 2, 99 Stat. 185 (1985). The United States Court of Veterans Appeals was established by an act of Congress “under Article I of the Constitution of the United States”. Veterans Judicial Review Act of 1988 (VJRA), Pub.L. 100-687, Title III, Sec. 301, 102 Stat. 4113 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (formerly § 4051)). “The Court of Veterans Appeals shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.” 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (formerly § 4052). Under this authority, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over such actions appealed from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to fulfill the jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1991). While the majority relies on the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1991), which does not specifically enumerate the United States Court of Veterans Appeals as a “court of the United States,” it is noteworthy that this statute has not been amended since 1982, prior to the enactment of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988. The United States Supreme Court has held since 1828 that the judicial power of the United States is not limited to the judicial power as defined under Article III of the United States Constitution and may be exercised by legislative courts. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 546, 7 L.Ed. 242 (1828). The Supreme Court has recently held that an Article I court, which exercises judicial power, can be a “Court of Law,” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Freytag v. C.I.R., — U.S. —, *236111 S.Ct. 2631, 2644-45, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991). In that light, the United States Court of Veterans Appeals, being an Article I court, can be a “court of the United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §§ 451 and 2412. Thus, the EAJA is applicable to this Court, and Essex binds us to the law of the Federal Circuit.

Jones v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 362, decided 1992-04-23.

PER CURIAM: On November 25, 1991, the Court ordered appellant, Ponce L. Jones, to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, since his Notice of Appeal (NOA) was received 276 days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period prescribed by 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (formerly § 4066(a)). In his response, appellant perforce challenges 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) as applied to the facts he asserts. In an effort to enlarge the 120-day NOA time period, he states that his mental impairment caused an inability to *363function as normal and to care for his affairs; he also submits a doctor’s statement to the effect that he suffered from a major mental illness and was hospitalized. He does not say at what time he suffered the affliction, so we will deem that it was at a relevant time for purposes of his argument.

We hold that the jurisdictional period for noting an appeal imposed by 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) cannot be extended or its commencement postponed for the reason advanced by appellant. See Butler v. Derwinski, 960 F.2d 139, 141 (Fed.Cir.1992); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)(B) (formerly § 4092(d)(2)(B)); Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224, 225-26 (Fed.Cir.1992).

We do not deem Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 498 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990), to control this question. Irwin dealt with whether a statute of limitations for commencing a suit or civil action against the government in a federal district court could be enlarged through the doctrine of equitable tolling. As observed above, and as deemed critical by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Butler, section 7266 defines the jurisdiction of this Court to hear appeals and “does not authorize the court to extend that time.” Butler, at 141 (citing Machado v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 389, 391 (Fed.Cir.1991)). To the extent this Court’s decision in Elsevier v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 150 (1991), suggests that the doctrine of equitable tolling is “potentially applicable” to the 120-day statutory period for noting an appeal to this Court, Id. at 154, we deem the Butler decision to have overruled it.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Jones v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 158, decided 1992-08-25.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STEINBERG, Associate Judge: The appellant, Vietnam veteran George T. Jones, appeals from a November 1, 1990, decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA or Board) denying an increased rating for his service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), currently rated at 50% disabling, and denying entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to his service-connected conditions. Because the Board failed to provide an adequate statement of the reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions, the matter will be remanded to the Board for readjudication.

The veteran served on active duty from August 1967 to August 1969, including combat service in Vietnam. He has held a service-connected disability rating for a psychiatric disorder since August 1969. That condition, originally characterized as “anxiety reaction”, is now rated as “PTSD with anxiety reaction”. R. at 92. In a November 29, 1988, rating decision by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office, the rating for that condition was increased from 10% to 50%. R. at 92. The veteran appealed that decision, asserting entitlement to a higher schedular rating, and to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability due to service-connected disabilities. The Board, in its November 1, 1990, decision, denied both claims.

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs (Secretary) has moved for partial summary af-firmance of the Board’s denial of the claim for an increased schedular rating, and summary remand of the veteran’s claim for a total disability rating based on individual unemployability. With regard to the former claim, the Secretary asserts that there were no factual, legal, or procedural errors in the Board’s decision; as to the latter claim, he asserts that the Board erred in failing to provide an adequate statement of the reasons or bases for its evaluation of the evidence pertaining to the veteran’s ability to obtain and retain substantially gainful employment, and of the applicability of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (1991). The Secretary also states that, on remand, the Board should determine whether further eviden-tiary development is necessary with regard to the unemployability claim. The veteran asserts that reversal is warranted as to both claims, and argues, in the alternative, that both claims should be remanded due to the Board’s failure to provide an adequate statement of the reasons or bases for its decision.

The majority of the Board’s “discussion and evaluation” consists of a summary of the lay and medical evidence of record, including August 1989 statements of a private psychiatrist and VA-contracted certified mental health counselor, both of whom state that the veteran is totally disabled or unemployable due to his PTSD (R. at 68-69, 74-75), and a May 1990 Social Security Administration (SSA) document indicating that the veteran was found to be disabled for purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) due to “anxiety related disorder”. Supp.R. at 1. The Board’s evaluation of that evidence is contained in two paragraphs:

The schedular rating now in effect for the [PTSD] contemplates the presence of considerable social and industrial impairment. The disorder does not, however, impair intellectual or cognitive functions. The appellant retains fair insight and judgment. The disorder would not prevent all forms of gainful employment. The residuals of [a] gunshot wound of the right mandible, tinnitus, or rhinitis which are also service connected would not impair employment function for all forms of work. In reaching that conclusion we have considered the veteran’s recent entitlement to [SSA] benefits. We note that entitlement to that benefit is based on conditions for which service connection may not be in effect. This determination is limited to a consideration of those conditions for which ser*160vice connection is in effect. We have reviewed the record carefully, but do not find that the evidence is so evenly balanced as to raise a reasonable doubt.

George T. Jones, BVA 90-38972, at 6 (Nov. 1, 1990).

The Board is required to provide a written statement of the reasons or bases for its findings and conclusions on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record; the statement must be adequate to enable a claimant to understand the precise basis for the Board’s decision, as well as to facilitate review in this Court. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (formerly § 4004); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 49, 57 (1990); Masors v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 181, 188 (1992). To comply with this requirement, the Board must analyze the credibility and probative value of the evidence, account for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, and provide the reasons for its rejection of any evidence favorable to the veteran. See Abernathy v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 391, 394 (1992); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 164, 169 (1991); Gilbert, supra. Here, for the reasons set forth below, the Board erred in failing (1) to provide an explanation for its implicit rejection of the opinions of the veteran’s psychiatrist and mental health counselor that the veteran was “totally unemployable”, “100% disabled”, and suffered “totally disabling” PTSD (R. at 69, 75); (2) to discuss the relevant lay and medical evidence in relation to the applicable schedular rating criteria for purposes of explaining its denial of an increased schedular rating; (3) to discuss the relevant lay and medical evidence in relation to its conclusion that the veteran is not precluded from engaging in all forms of substantially gainful activity; and (4) to explain its conclusion that the “anxiety related disorder” upon which the veteran’s SSDI award was based is separate from the veteran’s service-connected PTSD.

The Board was required to provide reasons or bases for its implicit rejection of the 1989 psychiatrist’s and counsel- or’s opinions that the veteran is totally disabled and unemployable due to his PTSD. See Fluharty v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 409, 413 (1992); Abernathy, supra; Gilbert, supra. The Board merely summarized that evidence, but provided no explanation for rejecting it. Jones, BVA 90-38972, at 4-6. Therefore, remand is required to allow the Board to consider that evidence, to make findings as to its credibility and probative value, and to explain fully its evaluation of it. Furthermore, this evidence pertains directly to both of the veteran’s claims. In determining that the veteran was not entitled to a schedular rating in excess of 50%, the Board implicitly rejected those opinions, which stated that he was “100% disabled” and that his condition was “totally disabling”, and failed to explain why that evidence would not support a 70% or 100% rating. R. at 69, 75; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Code (DC) 9411 (1991) (criteria for 70% and 100% ratings for PTSD). Similarly, in concluding that the veteran was not unemployable, the Board implicitly rejected the opinion stating that the veteran was “totally unemployable” without providing reasons therefor. R. at 69.

The Board also failed to explain why, in light of the medical evidence as to the severity of the veteran’s PTSD, it concluded that his condition produced “considerable” social and industrial impairment (the criterion for a 50% rating) rather than “severe” (70%) or “total” (100%) impairment. See Ohland v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 147, 150 (1991) (Board’s decision is deficient when it fails to explain the criteria used in determining which schedular category is appropriate in light of the medical evidence); Webster v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 155, 159 (1991) (same). Particularly in light of the opinions that the veteran’s PTSD is “totally” or “100%” disabling, the Board must explain why it applied the schedular rating for “considerable” impairment rather than “severe” or “total” impairment. See Webster, supra (BVA must provide explanation for determination as to rating category, especially when its determination appears on its face inconsistent with much of the relevant evidence of record); see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.7 (1991) (“[w]here there is a question as to which of two schedular *161categories shall be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating”). Furthermore, in discussing the applicability of the 70% and 100% schedular rating criteria in this case, the Board must address the evidence demonstrating that the veteran has been unable to retain employment for any significant period of time, despite numerous attempts. The schedule provides for a 100% rating if the veteran is “[d]emonstrably unable to obtain or retain employment”, and a 70% rating if there is severe impairment in his ability “to obtain or retain employment”. 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, DC 9411 (1991) (emphasis added).

The Board’s decision that the veteran is not precluded from all forms of substantially gainful employment also must be supported by reasons or bases; a mere conclusory statement is insufficient. See Masors, 2 Vet.App. at 188; Gleicher v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 26, 28 (1991); Hyder v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 221, 224 (1991); Hatlestad v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. at 169-70. Here, the Board simply stated that the veteran’s service-connected disabilities “would not prevent all forms of gainful employment”, without discussing the contrary evidence or the applicable statutory and regulatory criteria. (The veteran also holds service-connected disability ratings for residuals of a gunshot wound of the right mandible, currently rated at 10%, tinnitus, currently rated at 10%, and rhinitis, currently rated noncompensable.) Again, the Board failed to address the psychiatrist’s and mental health counselor’s opinions that the veteran is “totally unemployable” and suffers from “totally disabling” PTSD. Therefore, the Board will be required on remand to consider whether the veteran is unemployable, and to provide an adequate explanation of its decision, according to the criteria of the applicable regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b) (1991) (where claimant fails to meet minimum schedular requirements in section 4.16(a), but is unable to pursue substantially gainful employment, claim should be submitted for extra-schedular consideration). See Mingo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 51, 53-54 (1992). Furthermore, if, on remand, the veteran is awarded a 70% rating for his PTSD, the Board must consider whether he is unemployable due to his service-connected conditions under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a), and whether he is unemployable solely due to his PTSD under the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c).

Finally, the Board failed to provide an adequate statement of the reasons or bases for its conclusion that the veteran’s entitlement to SSDI benefits “is based on conditions for which service connection may not be in effect”. Jones, BVA 90-38972, at 6. The SSDI benefits were awarded due to “anxiety related disorders”. Supp.R. at 1. However, the Board provided no explanation for concluding that the referenced “anxiety related disorders” were distinct from the veteran’s PTSD. A September 13, 1989, report of a special psychiatric evaluation by a board of psychiatrists, which VA specifically requested, stated: “The examiners felt that the veteran’s obsessive compulsive disorder, which is an anxiety disorder, could best be subsumed under his PTSD, rather than considered a separate disorder. The obsessive compulsive disorder did not appear to begin until his service in Vietnam.” R. at 89. At a minimum, the BVA was required to provide an explanation for its implicit rejection of that evidence. If the Board finds the record inadequate to determine whether the anxiety-related disorders referred to by the SSA are distinct from the veteran’s PTSD, it should seek to obtain further information from the SSA pertaining to the determination of the veteran’s disability for SSDI purposes. See Masors, 2 Vet.App. at 187-88 (BVA should seek to obtain SSA documents indicated in the record which are pertinent to the claim).

As the above analysis demonstrates, the Court finds numerous errors in the BVA decision. For that reason, the Court finds that the decision is not sufficiently well articulated to “permit effective judicial review” on the appellant’s contention that the BVA also committed clear and reversible error in failing to award a rating higher than 50%. Gilbert, 1 Vet.App. at 57.

*162Upon consideration of the record, the Secretary’s motion for partial summary af-firmance and partial summary remand, and the appellant’s brief and reply brief, the Court holds that the Board erred in failing to provide an adequate statement of the reasons or bases for its decision. The Secretary’s motion for partial summary affir-mance is denied, and the Court vacates the November 1, 1990, BVA decision and remands the matter for prompt readjudication, in accordance with this decision, on the basis of all evidence and material of record and applicable provisions of law and regulation, and issuance of a new decision supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), (d)(1); Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 394, 397 (1991). On remand, the appellant will be free to submit additional evidence and argument. The Court further holds that summary disposition is appropriate because the case is one “of relative simplicity” and the outcome is controlled by the Court’s precedents and is “not reasonably debatable”. Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 23, 25-26 (1990). The Court retains jurisdiction. The Secretary shall file with the Clerk and serve upon the appellant a copy of any Board final decision on remand. Within 14 days after such filing, the appellant shall notify the Clerk whether he desires to seek further review by the Court.

VACATED AND REMANDED.